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The past decade has seen a wave of land leases, sales and 
concessions unparalleled since colonial times. Concurrently, 
many countries are embroiled in ongoing remedial and restitutive 
work over historical land leases, sales and concessions that have 
failed or had unforeseen consequences. This raises the question 
of whether historical agreements can provide insights into long-
term outcomes of latter-day land deals. Three cases are reviewed 
of agreements between British authorities and indigenous groups, 
and the outcomes are compared critically. The article concludes 
that the terms of such agreements are often far broader than 
the written words, and that if modern agreements are to avoid 
complications in the long term they should be closely attuned to 
the longevity of verbal commitments, cultural protocols 
and trust relationships. 
Keywords: Treaty negotiation, land tenure, land grabs, legal 
evidence, indigenous land rights; aboriginal land tenure.
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Introduction
n the past decade, a wave of large scale land agreements 
has taken place globally (Karsenty 2010, Cotula and 
Vermeulen 2011, World Bank 2010, Zagema 2011, 
Geary 2012). These land transactions often take the 
form of complex packages with embedded expectations 
about investment and employment creation (Cotula et al. 
2009: 6), and although dominated by the private sector rather 
than by governments, they contain elements in common with 
land agreements negotiated between British authorities and 
indigenous groups as a part of colonial expansion. Comparable 
features include the fact that some of the granted land is already 
utilised (or at least claimed); there is a tendency to treat land 
as commodified property, which may be foreign to indigenous 
perspectives; there is frequently an absence of legal mechanisms 
to protect local interests (Cotula et al. 2009: 4,7), so agreements 
may ‘legitimize and entrench the claims of external investors over 
those of poor local rights-holders’ (Cotula and Vermeulin 2011: 
47), and well-resourced purchasers today still also tend to acquire 
land from under-resourced land occupiers. Furthermore, just as 
historical treaties and concessions were sometimes simplistic, 
so too is there a tendency for latter-day contracts to be ‘short 
and simple compared to the economic reality of the transaction’ 
(Cotula et al. 2009: 7); to be complicated by factors such as the 
complexity of local customary land rights (Cotula et al. 2009: 8); 
and to be couched in terms of formal conveyancing law without 
recourse to indigenous title and social tenure institutions 
(Berry 1989).
      Where land agreements go awry, legal remedial measures 
are sometimes resorted to, for example between the State and 
indigenous peoples of New Zealand and Canada. These legal 
measures typically employ detailed legislative provisions that 
suggest a reaction against complications arising from loose 




diverse understandings of legally savvy newcomers with indigenous 
land occupiers. Alternatively, where land access is perceived to 
be unjust, the remedy chosen may be that of violent redress, for 
example in Zimbabwe and Brazil. Both avenues are costly and best 
avoided, and since it seems reasonable to assume that latter-day 
land transactions may in years to come be burdened with legacies 
comparable with historical treaties and concessions, this raises the 
research question of whether a close inspection of colonial land 
agreements could provide insights capable of informing policy in 
contemporary agreements. This article explores three historical 
cases – namely New Zealand, Canada and Zimbabwe – with a view 
to capturing both the spirit of what was agreed and details of how 
those agreements have fared in intervening years. In all three cases, 
evidence is drawn from the literature supplemented by interviews, 
which took place in New Zealand (2001 – 2012), Canada (2001 
and 2003) and Zimbabwe (2005, 2009, 2012 and 2014). 
Methods
Special difficulties are associated with getting to the heart of 
historical agreements. In practice, written documents with 
appended signatures or written marks are still often accorded 
more weight than other forms of evidence, but this may be a 
mistake. As Shortland comments, of New Zealand: ‘We who have 
so long trusted to the authority of books, are, I am persuaded, 
too suspicious of the credibility of the traditionary history of a 
people who have not yet weakened their memories by trusting 
to a written language’ (Shortland 1997 (1851): 95). A variety of 
forms of evidence are admissible in law, and current interpretations 
acknowledge that the spirit of agreements is paramount. Certainly, 
verbal evidence, preserved by oral tradition or records of debates 
about discussions and promises offered prior to signing and 
frequently couched in figurative or metaphorical language, often 
carried considerable weight in swaying opinion of contracting 
parties. In fact, a person’s word was often paramount from an 
indigenous point of view, especially when ratified by some form 
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of cultural protocol such as smoking a pipe of peace. Alternative 
evidence strands such as these are borne in mind as the three cases 
are now considered.
The Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand
The Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti o Waitangi) was signed in 
February 1840 by representatives of the British Crown and some 
Maori chiefs, more of whom signed later. It led to the declaration of 
British sovereignty later that year. The English version of the Treaty 
comprises three relatively simple articles, namely sovereignty (ceded 
to the British Crown), property rights (retained by Maori as long as 
they wished) and citizenship (protected for all people). In the Maori 
language version, Te Tiriti is more explicitly about kawanatanga 
(governing authority granted to the Crown), rangatiratanga 
(Maori authority over their own property and lives) and tikanga 
(protection of Maori custom). Semantic discrepancies and multiple 
understandings have been widely debated – for example, the 
absurdity of Maori signing the Treaty if it meant relinquishing 
rangatiratanga and mana (personal and tribal authority) (Palmer 
2008: 70) – yet these remain largely unresolved except for general 
agreement that the focus should be on Treaty principles rather than 
the exact words.
      Although the written words of the Treaty have assumed 
great importance in the intervening years, words of explanation and 
endorsement would have carried considerable weight at the time. 
For example, the verbal endorsement of the proposed Treaty by 
the missionary Henry Williams would have been crucial in view of 
the trust relationship he had built up with Maori over many years. 
Williams said that the missionaries fully approved of the Treaty and 
that it was ‘the act of love towards them on the part of the Queen, 
who desired to secure to them their property, rights and privileges’, 
and it was ‘a fortress for them against any foreign power which 
might desire to take possession of their country’ (Rogers 1998: 165, 
Orange 1987: 45). For Maori, possession by a foreign power was a
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real fear, and they had a particular dread of the French. This dated 
back to 1772, when ‘a French captain, Marion du Fresne, was killed 
by the Maoris, presumably for a breach of the Maori law of tapu. 
The French sent in a punitive expedition, which by its severity 
was to remain a stigma in the Maori mind’ (Rogers 1998: 90). 
Williams’s words would have carried particular weight in the light 
of rumours, in September 1839, that a French man-of-war was in 
the offing to annex New Zealand, rumours that were taken seriously 
enough for an English ship to be sent from New South Wales to 
deal with the threat (Rogers 1998: 89-90). 
     As well as the verbal endorsement of missionaries, words 
spoken at the signing ceremonies would also have been important. 
As each chief signed and shook hands with Captain Hobson, he 
announced ‘He iwi tahi tatou’ – ‘We are now one people’ (Orange 
1987: 57), suggesting a spirit of a partnership between equal peoples. 
The signatures appended to the Treaty at Waitangi were followed 
by several months during which copies of the Maori versions of the 
Treaty were taken around New Zealand, gathering signatures. We 
know that the subsequent explanations were not always as clear as 
on that first occasion at Waitangi, and for the chiefs who signed, 
these verbal explanations probably carried far more weight than the 
written words (Moon 2002). Crown representatives, picked almost 
at random, were despatched to get Maori signatures on the Treaty, 
‘like travelling quacks, selling some cure-all elixir’ (Moon 2002: 
132). Maori consent was helped by ‘presents or other pecuniary 
arrangements’, for example ‘gifts’ of blankets (p112), that call into 
question the ‘free and intelligent consent’ initially called for by 
the British Colonial Office in the wake of their acknowledgement 
of the Declaration of Independence by the United Tribes of New 
Zealand (Orange 1987: 21). Consent was also meant to have been 
‘expressed according to … established usages’ (Orange 1987: 31), 
but the application of the Treaty by the Crown relied more on the 
established usages of English law, and later, Crown deeds to land 
regularly eclipsed native title (e.g. R v Symonds (1847) NZPCC 387 
and Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur. (NS) 72).
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So how did Maori envisage the Treaty guarantees and protections? 
One chief, Te Kemara, in the debate leading up to the signing 
of the Treaty, complained that the Governor (representing the 
Queen) would be ‘up’ and he would be ‘down low, small, a worm, a 
crawler’ (Caselberg 1975: 44). Clearly he was concerned that Maori 
signatories risked losing their mana. As Rogers comments, ‘All the 
implications of sovereignty in its legal sense they may not have 
understood, but that they were to become lesser chiefs under the 
Queen’s authority they could grasp quite well’ (Rogers 1998: 170). 
But authority was one thing, land use quite another. The northern 
chief Nopera Panakareao understood from the Treaty that ‘the 
shadow of the land goes to the Queen, but the substance remains 
to us … We now have a helmsman for our canoe’ (Caselberg 
1975: 25), which suggests an understanding of a benevolent and 
guiding Queen who nevertheless was a titular head only. A scant 
eight months later, Nopera Panakareao, observing the practical 
implementation of the Treaty, is quoted as saying: ‘The Substance 
of the land goes to the Europeans, the shadow only will be our 
portion’ (Ward 1968, Preface).
     There is conflicting evidence about whether Maori 
understood the implications of selling land, and the exclusive rights 
that were subsequently claimed by settler owners. There was no 
Maori word for ownership (Waitangi Tribunal 1997: 73), and the 
phrase ‘tuku whenua’ had specific connotations of land assigned 
to people brought in to swell a hapu (tribe). Maori certainly 
recognised the importance of land to their continued way of life, 
and many understood the worthlessness of blankets, axes and pots 
in comparison with land (Te Waharoa in Caselberg 1975: 29). 
Europeans, on the other hand, saw land transactions as separating 
land from people – an absolute alienation of land. In short, ‘Western 
land sales were diametrically opposed to the traditional concepts’ 
(Waitangi Tribunal 1997: 74).
     Recent analysis of the effect of treaties with indigenous people 
(Waitangi Tribunal 1997: 386-388), supports the view that it is the 
understandings of the indigenous signatories that should prevail. 
There is strong evidence that the verbal discussions at Waitangi
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focused on what would be protected for Maori – their rights to and 
authority over their lands (Orange 1987: 46). Furthermore, the 
statement from the Waitangi Tribunal with regard to land sales, 
that ‘there was also no contractual mutuality or common design, 
but a fundamental ideological divide’ (Waitangi Tribunal 1997: 
399), can apply just as easily to the wider Treaty context. The legal 
and constitutional place of the Treaty of Waitangi is therefore still 
contested, although it is now widely accepted at a political level that 
the Treaty of Waitangi ‘is a valid international treaty and binding 
on the Crown at international law and as a matter of honour’ 
(Palmer 2008: 25). Furthermore, in the current constitutional 
debate in New Zealand (investigating whether New Zealand 
should develop a written constitution), although there is widespread 
acknowledgement that the Treaty will need to be incorporated 
into a constitution in some form, the scope of that form is highly 
contested and is thus likely to present a significant barrier to the 
acceptance of an entrenched written constitution.
Canadian Treaties
British sovereignty was asserted over the lands and the people of 
Canada by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The possession of the 
lands of the Indians was not ceded, but the Royal Proclamation 
established that no lands could be purchased other than through 
the Crown. There is nothing especially remarkable about this; 
sovereignty over territory (imperium) is quite different from 
proprietorship of lands (dominium). However, the explicit statement 
of that fact reinforced the necessity for the Crown thereafter to 
negotiate, and record by treaty, the cession of lands from the 
Indians to the Crown. The negotiation of such treaties must 
therefore be put under the spotlight to determine what exactly was 
agreed upon and what was ceded.
     Canadian treaty-making began in the eastern settlements, 
with several agreements allowing for British and French settlement 
there. Subsequently, a series of numbered treaties were negotiated 
and signed as part of the inexorable westward expansion of colonial 
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control and settlement of the interior prairie lands of central 
Canada.2 Most of these treaties were similar in their official wording 
although they were signed under different circumstances. Treaty 7, 
signed in 1877 in southern Alberta, is used here as a representative 
example of Canadian treaties of that period. The Crown’s sovereign 
authority over the prairie land was under threat because there was 
no actual presence of any Canadian authority in southern Alberta 
until the first arrival of the North West Mounted Police (NWMP) 
in 1873. The treaty commissioners were keen to establish the treaties 
over the Prairie Provinces to make their sovereignty claims apparent 
on the ground (Henderson 1997: 75). 
     The indigenous peoples of southern Alberta include the 
Siksika, Stoney, Peigan, Sarcee and Blood bands. They came 
together as the Blackfoot Confederation, under a well respected 
chief, Crowfoot, who had developed a close and trusting 
relationship with Colonel Macleod of the NWMP (Dempsey 1972). 
On this basis Crowfoot was able to call together the various bands 
to negotiate land sharing and access agreements with the treaty 
commissioners. The historical records indicate that the preliminary 
discussions leading to the treaty were almost exclusively concerned 
with what the chiefs and individuals of the nation would receive 
by accepting the treaty. There is ‘no evidence to indicate that the 
issue of ceding or surrendering the land was ever raised by the 
commissioners in the discussions’ (Treaty 7 Elders et al. 1997: 255) 
and it appears that the treaty was never read out in full (p258).3
          The treaty commissioners, in their discussions with the 
Indians, were at pains to emphasise the expectation that the 
continuity of the Blackfoot way of life – their occupation, hunting 
and access to all their lands – would be assured (Morris 1880: 
268). However, the written treaty presented to them included 
an agreement to ‘cede, release, surrender, and yield up to the 
Government of Canada for Her Majesty the Queen and her 
successors forever, all their rights, titles and privileges whatsoever to 
(their) lands …’ (Treaty 7 text. Morris 1880).
          The continuing conflict about the legal effect of the treaty is 
thus whether the written words of the treaty, validated by signatures 
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and recorded in the historical written records of the Crown, take 
precedence over the oral agreement, represented by negotiations 
and discussions, which was validated by the protocol of smoking 
the sacred pipe and is vividly recalled in the oral histories of the 
indigenous people. Several formal agreements across Canada were 
also recorded in Wampum belts – belts of shell beads, woven in 
patterns – that reinforced the stories and recorded the treaties with 
the Crown (Borrows 2006). However:
          … marks on a printed sheet of paper had about as much   
           significance for many aboriginal peoples as the colours and   
           patterns of a treaty belt had for many English. The treaty was  
           neither the written memorial nor the belt but the agreement  
           reached by the parties during the oral exchanges
           (Slattery 2000: 208).
          The language used in negotiations is of great significance to 
understanding the relative positions of both parties. The Crown 
commissioners regularly resorted to the language of fraternity. It is 
the language of a self-assured highly literate culture wishing to get 
agreement to its position by bolstering the status of the illiterate 
native (who nevertheless possesses what the Crown seeks). The 
Queen is portrayed as a benevolent mother figure for the Indians, 
and the settlers as their brothers. ‘Colonial officials participated 
in ceremonial exchanges and adopted the language of kinship 
to describe the relationships this confirmed, but it subsequently 
became evident that their view of what took place at these meetings 
differed profoundly from the Aboriginal understanding of events’ 
(RCAP 1996: 646).
          On the Indian side, the figurative language employed 
illustrated their world view and regularly made reference to nature; 
the soil, rivers flowing, and the sun shining. “At the signing of 
the treaty at Blackfoot Crossing, Red Crow pulled out the grass 
and gave it to the White officials and informed them that they 
[would] share the grass of the earth with them. Then he took 
some dirt from the earth and informed them that they could not 
share this part of the earth and what was underneath it, because 
it was put there by the Creator for the Indians’ benefit and use”              
4
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(Treaty 7 Elders et al. 1997: 114).
           There was no mention made to sell land; or to sell what is   
           underneath the land; or to sell the mountains, trees, lakes, rivers,  
           and rocks. And we didn’t say to sell the animals that travel on the 
           and – the ones that we eat – or the birds that fly, or the fish that  
           swim. The Old People didn’t get asked to sell these things. They  
           were told ‘the Queen will be like your mother, and she will take  
           care of you until the Sun stops shining, the mountains disappear,  
           the rivers stop flowing, and the grass stops growing’ 
           (Calf Robe 1979: 21).
          Red Crow’s symbolism would by no means have been alien to 
the English, for whom a common law ceremony (valid in England 
until 1925) involved handing over a handful of earth or a twig in 
front of witnesses to transfer rights in land. However, while for the 
Europeans transferred rights were generally exclusive (other than 
for relatively minor easements), from the Blackfoot perspective, 
the ‘magnificent gift’ (Friesen 1999) to the Crown and the settlers 
was the opening up of their traditional hunting lands to some form 
of shared access. They were not alienating their land forever in a 
way that would exclude them from it. They were merely saying the 
Europeans could come onto the land to use it for their purposes, 
and the Indians would retain access to it for their purposes; in 
effect, ‘we can all share this land’. It is obvious that the Blackfoot 
people could not have been aware of the incompatibility of uses 
and the Western requirement for private property and exclusive 
ownership; sharing was not what land-hungry settlers wanted. 
          Different cultural and legal traditions create different views 
about what gives an agreement validity, and for the Europeans, 
total emphasis was placed on the written text, duly authorised by 
signatures. Pomp and ceremony was an important adjunct to the 
signature, hence there was a good deal of formality attached to the 
process. This included dressing up (the presence of the NWMP 
assisted in this colourful display of formality) and making speeches. 
In fact, Indian signatures were not collected on Treaty 7, but a 
name was recorded and an X mark was inserted. Usually the Indian 
signatory did not even write the X but was merely asked to touch 
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the pen, a rather remote enactment of a signature. Furthermore, 
Dempsey relates the story that Crowfoot in his apprehension of 
being swindled by the treaty commissioners reached for the pen but 
did not actually make contact with it (Dempsey 1972: 105). 
         The treaty commissioners were prepared to add aboriginal 
ceremonies to their own to recognise that these were reciprocal 
bargains, and to this end they were comfortable indulging in 
the pipe ceremonies and allowing for Blackfoot celebrations. It 
is doubtful, however, if they understood the significance of an 
agreement made in the presence of the pipe. From an aboriginal 
point of view: ‘The Indians have utmost and absolute belief in the 
sacredness of the pipe. In the presence of the pipe, only the truth 
must be used and any commitment made in its presence must be 
kept’ (RCAP 1996: 64-5). In other words, for the Blackfoot, the 
pipe has intense spiritual and moral force, and it validated the oral 
agreement as the true interpretation of the treaty. But despite the 
treaty negotiations being conducted alongside the ceremony of the 
pipe, it is likely that the Treaty commissioners saw these aboriginal 
ceremonies as ‘merely a picturesque preliminary favoured by Indian 
custom’ (Taylor 1999: 18). For Treaty 7 elders, in contrast, the pipe 
solemnised a friendship and made scrutinising details unnecessary 
(Treaty 7 Elders 1997: 324-5). The treaty can hardly, therefore, be 
viewed as a meeting of the minds.
Zimbabwean treaties and concessions
Nineteenth century treaties and concessions in Zimbabwe need to 
be viewed in the light of the Matabele war which, by 1894, had 
established conquest as the method of acquiring territory rather 
than treaty-making. However, earlier agreements warrant scrutiny 
since grievances surrounding their signing continue, in particular 
over verbal assurances given at the time of signing, some of which 
are still contentious (e.g. Magaisa 2008). 
         The first recorded treaty over Zimbabwean soil, signed by 
Mzilikazi with the Boers in 1853, was primarily a right of way 
over Matabele territory. This was followed in 1870 by the Tati 
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and the Shashi concessions, signed by Mzilikazi’s son, Lobengula. 
The former was over an area disputed with a Bechuana tribe, and 
by granting a concession Lobengula was tacitly asserting control 
over the area, and the latter was probably also a veiled territorial 
statement. Thereafter, apart from a minor concession in 1871 to 
Thomas Baines, no further concessions or treaties were granted until 
1888, when Lobengula signed both the Moffat treaty (by which 
he agreed not to give away any part of his territories without the 
sanction of Britain), and the Rudd concession. 
         The written terms of the Rudd concession were 
straightforward. It was a mining lease for an initial sum plus a 
fixed monthly amount, granted to three representatives of Cecil 
Rhodes’ mining company, namely Rudd, Thompson and Maguire. 
About a year later this concession would provide the foundation 
for the Royal Charter from Britain that created the British South 
Africa Company. The document was drafted by Rudd, altered ‘to 
suit the understanding of the native mind’ (Rouillard 1977: 136), 
then couched in legal form by the inexperienced Maguire, who 
had ‘not found it necessary to practice’ after being called to the bar 
in 1883 (Hiller 1949: 151). A missionary, the Reverend Helm, was 
present during the negotiations to ensure they were fair and in the 
interests of the natives. He signed as a witness and to certify that 
the document had been fully interpreted and explained. In any case, 
there would have been little need to lie about the Rudd concession, 
which may have represented ‘the thin end of the wedge’ for the 
British but which in itself gave away little. Lobengula’s motives are 
a matter of conjecture (e.g. Warhust 1973: 60-61) but certainly no 
land rights were conveyed other than in a negative sense of agreeing 
not to grant land without the permission of the grantees. 
         Verbal assurances given at the signing are less straightforward. 
Figurative language was employed at several junctures to convey 
exact shades of meaning, and the words have frequently been 
invoked in raising grievances in later years. Thompson, as interpreter 
for the Rudd concession, held the view that ‘All discussion with 
natives on grave matters was in my time carried on more or less 
in metaphor, a style carrying much weight when skilfully used,’ 
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(Rouillard 1977: 128) and he confined himself to metaphorical 
terms that he believed would be best understood by the Matabele, 
sticking mainly to guns and cattle. Thompson compared 
Lobengula’s dominion to a dish of milk that was attracting flies 
(meaning countries wishing to secure mineral rights) and explained 
that what was sought was not land, only the right to dig for gold: 
‘I likened his country to a cow and said, “King, the cow is yours. If 
she dies the skin is yours, if she calves the calf is yours. I only want 
the milk.” The Matebili (sic) regarded milk as only fit for children, 
and not food for men.’ (Rouillard 1977: 188). Thompson repeated 
these words to Lobengula on a later occasion, and years later he sent 
a statement to the Privy Council repeating the metaphor in order 
to underline the fact that no rights to land were ever granted by 
the Rudd concession (Rouillard 1977: 188; Privy Council Judicial 
Committee, 1918). 
         Thompson used other figures of speech as well, and these 
have proved particularly helpful in conveying the spirit of what was 
agreed to. For example, Thompson tried to convey what was meant 
by the sole right to mine gold being requested, by pointing out 
that it would be inadvisable to have two bulls in one herd of cows, 
which one induna (chief) agreed was simply asking for the pair of 
them to fight rather than looking after the cows. Furthermore, in 
order to allay fears, he made the point that no one gives somebody 
an assegai if he expects to be attacked afterwards. In other words, 
if the whites planned to overthrow the Matabele they would hardly 
arm them with guns (Rouillard 1977: 130 - 131). Symbolic actions 
were also important, for example, Lobengula gave Thompson ‘a 
lion’s pad with the claws thrown back, a symbol that he, the Lion, 
had left me free without hurt’, and on another occasion a solecism 
was narrowly avoided when ‘a magnificent pair of Poll Angus’ 
cattle were purchased as a gift for Lobengula, their black colouring 
‘conveying to the Matebili (sic) almost a declaration of war’ 
(Rouillard 1977: 187).
         Lobengula signed the Rudd concession, but in the following 
months further discussions took place that today help to throw 
light on discussions about what exactly the concession conveyed. 
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Rival concession-hunters at Bulawayo suggested that the King 
would do well to study the word ‘land’ used in the written 
concession, and one of the whites, at a council with 300 indunas, 
challenged Thompson to explain the word. Thompson slyly 
responded by asking the indunas if they could tell whether a beast 
is male or female when shown only part of its hide. When they 
replied that the rest of its body would need to be seen, Thompson 
said that he too, could only interpret the word ‘land’ if shown the 
context (Rouillard 1977: 176). Lobengula, seeking reassurance 
about how his territory stood in relation to Britain, decided to send 
two indunas to the Queen, bearing two letters. The first letter, 
authenticated by Helm, was a declaration of Lobengula’s territorial 
claims (helpful to Rhodes, if anything, since it was easier dealing 
with one monarch than numerous petty chieftains) and a request to 
the Queen for protection under the Moffat treaty. The second letter, 
quite possibly a forgery since it bore Lobengula’s official elephant 
seal which was kept by the trader Fairburn, who opposed Rhodes 
(Blake 1977: 49), said that the indunas were making the journey 
to confirm on Lobengula’s behalf that there was indeed a queen, 
and to ask for someone to be sent by her to help with troublesome 
concession seekers. The reply, written by Lord Knutsford for the 
Queen, seems a veiled attempt to protect future British interests. 
Couched in figurative language worthy of Thompson himself, it 
cautions Lobengula not to put too much power into the hands of 
those who come first and exclude others equally deserving: ‘A King 
gives a stranger an ox, not his whole herd of cattle, otherwise what 
would other strangers eat?’ (Blake 1977: 50). 
         One last treaty should be mentioned in the Zimbabwean 
context, namely the Lippert Concession, obtained from Lobengula 
in April 1891 on behalf of Lippert, a German financier (Cherer 
Smith 1978: 35). Strictly, granting this concession was untenable 
either in written or customary law, for it reneged on the Rudd 
concession by which Lobengula had contracted not to grant land 
without the permission of the grantees (at that stage, effectively the 
British South Africa Company, since its creation on October 29th 
1889), and in any case Lobengula did not really have the power in 
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custom to grant land rights in Matabeleland (Palmer 1977: 27). 
The concession, probably an attempt to outmanoeuvre Rhodes 
by securing the land rights to the country, granted ‘The sole and 
exclusive right, power, and privilege for the full term of 100 ... 
years to lay out, grant, or lease ... farms, townships, building plots 
and grazing areas; to impose and levy rents, licences and taxes 
thereon, and to get in, collect and receive the same for his own 
benefit; to give and grant Certificates ... for the occupation of any 
farms, townships, building plots and grazing areas’ (Palmer 1977: 
27). Subsequent confirmation of the concession by John Moffat 
was probably not an endorsement of it but was motivated rather 
by Moffat’s belief that ‘only the disappearance of their military 
state could save the Ndebele’ and that the end justified the means 
(Warhurst 1973: 64). When Rhodes bought the concession it 
served to buttress the Rudd concession, whose weakness was in not 
giving control over land. There is some doubt about whether the 
terms of the Lippert concession were explained fully to Lobengula. 
Thompson, when asked by Rhodes about the signing of the Lippert 
concession, replied that, knowing Lobengula’s feelings about land, 
he was probably unaware of what he had put his signature to 
(Rouillard 1977: 189).
         In summary, in Zimbabwe the written terms of land 
agreements are plain but words spoken and taken as binding 
continue to be a source of contention today. In early land dealings, 
Europeans acted as if no one really expects marketplace talk to 
be other than inflated and hyperbolic, and it is the responsibility 
of buyers to examine goods carefully before purchase. For the 
Europeans, the written words were the goods. For the illiterate 
Matabele, however, the spoken word carried greater weight, and in 
later years when Francis (‘Matabele’) Thompson was accosted by 
one of Lobengula’s indunas and asked, ‘Ou Tomoson, how have you 
treated us, after all your promises, which we believed?’, Thompson 
had no answer (Rouillard 1977: 193). 
Outcomes of the land agreements
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Are any patterns discernible in the historical land agreements 
summarised above and their aftermath? Could these inform policy 
on new land agreements entered into today? A broad pattern 
emerges in the three countries over the century or century-and-a-
half since the founding land agreements, namely:
i) An initial period in which large areas of land changed hands
ii) An extended period of grievance with more or less open    
 objection, and 
iii) A recent period of legal and/or extra-legal redress of    
 perceived injustices. 
Considering these in order:
i) An initial period in which land changes hands: In Zimbabwe, 
the large scale dispossession of Shona and Ndebele from their 
customary lands occurred in a more blunt and forcible manner than 
for Maori, where a veneer of legality was preserved by the fact that 
land was purchased. Maori had at least nominal control over land 
alienation, although processes were heavily biased in favour of the 
settler (Gilling 1994, Williams 1999), and many land sales were 
characterised by a ‘combination of sharp trading, devious tactics, 
and deliberate swindles …’ (Fleras and Spoonley 1999: 134). The 
New Zealand wars in the North Island in the 1860s were the result 
of Maori resistance to selling their land, and these provided the 
justification for the punitive annexation of land following uprisings. 
In Zimbabwe, land grabbing by Europeans commenced even prior 
to the Lippert concession of 1891 (Palmer 1977: 35), and gained 
momentum in the three years following the partial conquest of 
the Matabele in 1893. In 1896-7 the Ndebele and Shona rebelled, 
with one positive result being that land reserves were created to 
safeguard indigenous peoples (Palmer 1977: 66). In both countries, 
the net effect was much the same. By 1891 Maori lands amounted 
to only 17 per cent of the country, much of which was marginal 
and effectively useless (King 2003: 258), and by 1914 Europeans 
controlled 75 per cent of Zimbabwe (Chitsike 2003: 2). In Canada, 
vast tracts of land transferred to the Crown to be allocated to 
1. 18
settlers, while relatively tiny portions of land were set aside as Indian 
Reserves to accommodate the Indians and enforce their cultural 
transition to settled agriculturalists. 
         ii) A period of objection: In New Zealand, Maori have a 
history of over a hundred and fifty years of calling upon the Crown 
to honour the Waitangi Treaty. Regular petitions, disputes taken to 
court and protest marches about non-adherence to Treaty promises 
have prompted successive governments to revive the Treaty as a basis 
for the Crown’s interactions with Maori. In Zimbabwe there were 
a variety of protests over the years, commencing with the Matabele 
and Shona rebellions. Later protest was sometimes through the 
voices of Native Commissioners and sometimes by other European 
advocates (for example, missionaries such as Arthur Shearly Cripps, 
and by John Harris, secretary of the Aboriginal Protection Society). 
Then in 1919 the Ndebele National Home Movement sent a petition 
to George V (Palmer 1977: 112), and in the 1950s and 1960s, 
African Nationalist protest became increasingly strident. In Canada, 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the segregation of 
Native peoples on reserves where many aspects of their lives were 
controlled by government agents left a people with little political 
power to defend their land, although band leaders regularly 
petitioned the Crown to restore their autonomy, actively protested 
against Crown policy, and successfully lodged claims to the 
Federal courts. Generally there was no widespread armed resistance 
although there have been several confrontations – for example, the 
confrontations in Oka Quebec in 1990 and Gustafsen Lake BC in 
1995 – that stand as a warning to Canada that the First Nations 
people will continue to defend their rights. 
         iii) Redress of perceived injustices: In 1975 the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act was passed, establishing the Waitangi Tribunal 
as a forum to ensure that the Treaty partnership was observed, 
particularly in relation to Crown actions affecting the rangatiratanga 
of Maori. In 1985, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was extended to 
allow Maori to seek redress for past actions of the Crown, back to 
1840. This Tribunal (supported by various court decisions) has been 
criticised for being revisionist or presentist in its interpretations of 
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the past relationship between Maori and the Crown (Oliver 2001), 
but it has nevertheless allowed Maori to air their grievances, has 
established a basis for settlement negotiations with the Crown, and 
been focused on the principles of the Treaty arrangement rather 
than a strict reading of the Treaty words. There are some beacons 
of success for Maori and the Crown, with some iwi now being able 
to move forward with a new awareness that the Treaty is more than 
just the face-value words, but is an agreement to share and protect 
various rights of governance and self-determination for the Crown 
and Maori. 
         In Canada, the 1982 Constitution provided for the 
recognition of the ‘existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada’ (sec 35 Constitution Act 1982) 
and, since 1973, the Comprehensive and Specific Land Claims 
process has allowed for negotiation between First Nations people 
and the Crown to settle past grievances. Much of the wider 
acknowledgement of aboriginal rights, treaty and title claims has 
derived from the regular resort to the higher level provincial and 
federal courts. The courts are increasingly recognizing the validity 
of oral evidence to support the understandings of custom and 
traditional positions. For example, in allowing for an aboriginal 
perspective to be considered in court, the Canadian Supreme Court 
decision of Delgamuukw 1997 (v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
1010) finds that the oral evidence of the Indians is an essential 
part of evidence and must be admissible by the courts. Lamer C.J. 
ordered a new trial of the Delgamuukw case specifically because the 
trial judge had erred by not allowing for the oral evidence of fact in 
the initial trial. Lamer C.J. quoted from his own judgement in Van 
der Peet ([1996] 2 S.C.R. 507): ‘a court should approach the rules of 
evidence and interpret the evidence that exists, with a consciousness 
of the special nature of Aboriginal claims, and of the evidentiary 
difficulties in proving a right which originates in times where 
there were no written records …’ This ruling has provided a very 
significant boost for indigenous people; allowing their oral evidence 
to be accepted and validated by the courts and supporting their 
negotiations with the Crown in recent treaties in British Columbia 
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and in the land claims process.
       Land agreements in Zimbabwe are founded on a more shaky 
legal footing than in New Zealand and Canada, and the redress of 
perceived wrongs, when it came, was done by recourse to violence 
(the guerrilla war of the 1970s) and by extra-legal land occupations 
which began in the late 1990s and evolved into the Fast Track 
Land Reform Program (FTLRP) which in the first decade of 
the twenty first century settled around 150,000 households in 
smallholder areas (A1 schemes), 30,000 households on medium-
scale A2 farms, in addition to other informal settlement (Scoones 
2015: 191). Political rhetoric in the last two decades has been 
strongly anti-British, and supportive of black Zimbabweans, for 
example through affirmative action and favouring of previously 
disadvantaged groups. Robert Mugabe has regularly stressed the 
importance of African solutions to African problems, a stance 
generally supported by leaders in the region even where it entailed a 
crippling economic cost and unconstitutional selective application 
of the law. Of particular significance in this article is that fact 
that in all three countries feelings still run high about the exact 
intention of land agreements, and that the land question has never 
finally been laid to rest. Two main issues are at stake: first, whether 
the spirit rather than the letter of agreements was honoured; and 
second, what steps have been taken to redress grievances. 
Treaty making questioned
Even prior to the Treaty of Waitangi, treaty-making was already 
questioned as an appropriate way for European power to obtain 
the consent of the distant indigenous people to the cession of their 
sovereignty and their lands. In 1837, the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Aborigines resolved that treaties were 
generally inappropriate:
        Compacts between parties negotiating on terms of such entire  
        disparity are rather the preparatives and the apology for disputes  
        than securities for peace: as often the resentment or the cupidity  
        of the more powerful body may be excited, a ready pretext for  
        complaint will be found in the ambiguity of the language in   
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         which their agreements must be drawn up, and in the superior  
         sagacity which the European will exercise in framing, in   
         interpreting, and in evading them (Palmer 2008: 42).
        But where treaties were signed, Europeans acted as if what was 
written and signed was of paramount importance, and seemed to 
see no impediment to exaggeration or even verbal misrepresentation 
in order to gain consensus. The natives, on the other hand, appeared 
to set more store by verbal discussions and assurances supported by 
whatever trust relationship had developed. Verbal assurances and 
explanations often drew on figurative language, with references 
to soil, rivers, grass, mountains, sun, cattle and motherhood. The 
use of such natural symbols suggests that these aspects of the 
natural world were viewed as being more universally understood 
and therefore represented the nature of agreements better than the 
culturally biased jargon of written documents.
        The treaties and land agreements in the three countries 
discussed have had significant adverse effects both on historical and 
current relationships between the State and indigenous peoples. 
An important aspect of the spirit of land agreements was the trust 
relationships between the contracting parties around the time of 
the treaty proceedings, in the same way that a trusted conveyancer 
may reassure a client that the fine print of a mortgage bond is 
innocuous and not worth reading. Lobengula sought reassurance 
from Thompson that his ‘heart [was] white towards the Matebili’ 
(Rouillard 1977: 186), the words of Henry Williams that the 
Treaty of Waitangi was ‘the act of love towards (Maori) on the part 
of the Queen’ carried considerable weight because Williams had 
proved trustworthy over a number of years, and Crowfoot’s trust 
relationship with Colonel Macleod was instrumental in enabling 
negotiations for Treaty 7. Any misunderstandings and grievances 
often stem from discrepancies between indigenous understandings 
of verbal agreements and the Crown’s stress on written documents. 
        In asserting their inherent superiority over the indigenous 
tribes, colonial authorities stressed the centrality of honourable 
behaviour. In all three countries, the British Queen is invoked 
by the Europeans as representing a level of justice higher than 
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governments, almost one of ideal justice, divinely ordained. The 
natives often acknowledged the overriding authority of the Queen 
and were led to expect that the Europeans would act honourably, 
and both Maori and Ndebele made representations directly to the 
Queen to record grievances. Natives were often surprised when the 
Europeans and their Queen failed to act honourably. For example, 
‘What took Ngai Tahu by surprise was that … promises were 
broken, when according to their ‘savage’ code of behaviour the 
promises of rangatira like Kemp or Mantell were sacrosanct’ (Evison 
1993: 492-3), and Lobengula accuses Thompson of ‘having two 
words,’ i.e. lying (Rouillard 1977: 196).
        Honourable intentions were expected from the cross-cultural 
agreements considered here, and after completing various cultural 
protocols, honourable implementation was assumed. In Canada’s 
case, indigenous protocols such as the smoking of a sacred pipe were 
a significant symbol of honourable intention, while in both New 
Zealand and Zimbabwe the formalities enhanced an expectation of 
the honourable implementation of the verbal understandings.
Conclusions
There are clear messages concerning land agreements today. First, 
considering land as commodified property within an expanding 
globalised market-place is still often at variance with an indigenous 
perspective on land as the basis of interpersonal and environmental 
relationships. Just as the indigenous view was generally incompatible 
with the colonial mind-set, it is now largely incompatible with the 
mindset of the global entrepreneur seeking land for a foreign people 
or state that has no stake in local community, land or environment. 
It is now recognised that the indigenous view may require state 
protection from the forces of economic imperialism. Second, the 
spirit of what is agreed to is by no means confined to written 
agreements; it is the understanding between contracting parties, 
including anything which helps to impart and communicate that 
understanding and to preserve it in memory. Third, perceived 
unfairness and injustice has a very long lifespan, passing from 
1. 23
one generation to the next. Fourth, where there is gross disparity 
in living standards and in access to resources (including land), 
grievances are likely even if overt consensus was reached in the past 
between representatives of contracting groups. 
        The figurative language used at the time of negotiation 
has proved itself pithy, well suited to capturing the essence of 
negotiating points, and capable of providing enduring mental 
images that should rightly be drawn on to colour legal interpretation 
today and to guide new land agreements. It is apparent that 
perceived injustices that still fester today frequently trace back to 
the verbal exchanges just as much as to the written agreements. This 
suggests that legal and administrative processes and settlements 
today, as well as being cognisant of the written word and black-
letter law, should pay greater attention to verbal commitments, cultural 
protocols, ways in which trustworthiness is established and to unwritten 
forms of evidence. A holistic approach to land agreements that recognises 
and factors in these attributes could avoid serious complications 
in the long-term. 
Notes 
1 For example, the Native Lands Acts of the latter part of the nineteenth 
century which required Maori to claim their customary title in court 
and exchange that for an individualised fee simple title deriving from the 
Crown (see Williams 1999).
2 Treaty 1 was signed in 1871 in Manitoba and subsequent treaties were 
signed in Saskatchewan and central Alberta, before treaty commissioners 
reached southern Alberta, and ultimately into north-eastern British 
Columbia.
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3 Local missionaries likely knew about the Blackfoot resistance to land 
surrender issues, and they probably sent warnings to the commissioners 
about the potential for disagreement. This may be why the land surrender 
was never raised for discussion and was only written into the treaty after 
the discussions and negotiations. Furthermore “First Nations would 
not consider making a treaty unless their way of life was protected and 
preserved. This meant the continuing use of their lands and natural 
resources” (RCAP 1996, 174).
4 Text of Treaty 7: “Her Indian people may know and feel assured of what 
allowance they are to count upon and receive from Her Majesty’s bounty 
and benevolence.”
5 As illustrated by the oral testimony of Lazarus Wesley (Treaty 7 Elders 
1997, 90): “The government was just allowed to use the land for growing 
things not given (it). This story has been handed down from the people 
not from any documents.” See also Taylor 1999, 43.
6 And see comment by Gordon Lee “The importance of the sacred pipe 
ceremony” in Price 1999, 111 and in Williams 1997, 47-48: “A treaty 
sanctified by the smoking of the pipe of peace became, in essence, a sacred 
text, a narrative that committed two different peoples to live according to 
a shared legal tradition – an American Indian vision of law and peace.” 
Also in Treaty 7 Elders 1997, 68: “The smoking of the pipe is similar to 
the non-Natives swearing on the Holy Bible” and at 89 quoting Turning 
Robe: “No one can just smoke it. We cannot lie when we smoke it.”
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